Digital sovereignty has become, if not a buzzword, then at least a topic that is increasingly prominent in discussions. It features in public statements and sometimes in IT department roadmaps, and if you take the time to think about it, it almost seems like common sense: taking back control, reducing dependencies, and securing data. However, the 2026 edition of the Lecko study on internal transformation ([FR]Download the study) shows that behind this apparent obviousness, sovereignty remains a deeply uncomfortable subject for organizations, not in terms of intentions, but in terms of decisions and their operational implementation.
In short:
- Digital sovereignty is widely desired but difficult to translate into concrete decisions due to Microsoft’s dominance and the bundling logic that structures usage.
- Sovereign alternatives cover 80 to 90% of needs, but the remaining, often critical, uses prevent complete and quick substitution.
- Decisions continue to be guided by practical considerations (efficiency, continuity), relegating sovereignty to the background despite its strategic importance.
- The transition to sovereign solutions involves a costly and long-term “double run”, which is often underestimated, with an increased organizational and cognitive burden for teams.
- The government plays an ambiguous role, acting as both a prescriber and user of dominant solutions and a competitor to sovereign publishers, which limits their development capacity.
Massive dependence, structured by usage and bundles
The first key figure from the study: 75% of work environments today rely on the Microsoft ecosystem. This does not refer to digital technology as a whole, but rather to office automation, messaging and collaboration, in other words, the daily foundation of cognitive and collective work. Alongside this is the world of business tools and ERPs, where the question is perhaps less pressing and where alternatives may be more obvious, even if implementation remains cumbersome.
This dominance cannot be explained by the intrinsic superiority of each individual tool, nor by a rational preference for one tool over another. It is based on two mechanisms that the study identifies and that cannot be separated: the ecosystem effect and the bundle effect. The tools are not used separately, but as a coherent whole, contractually, technically, and culturally integrated, which means that the suite becomes a standard not because it is optimal for each use, but because it allows for continuity in usage and financial costs and in terms of productivity linked to discontinuity and the impact that one imagines on the user experience (What (digital) workplace experience for your employees ?). Not having to make decisions on a tool-by-tool basis is also a natural consideration.
My interpretation is that this bundling logic plays a decisive role in dependency. As long as office automation, messaging, collaboration, identity, and, increasingly, automation and assistance functions are packaged together in the same offering (as we see today with AI and Copilot), comparisons with sovereign alternatives are rarely made on an equal footing. The debate is not about the value of each component, but about the political and organizational cost of moving away from all-in-one solutions.
What about substitutability?
One of the study’s key contributions is to move beyond the caricatured opposition between dominant solutions and sovereign alternatives. Lecko precisely quantifies the functional coverage of alternative solutions, revealing that sovereign office suites now cover between 80% and 90% of everyday needs. This figure invalidates the idea that sovereignty is blocked by a general immaturity of the tools.
But the study also clearly highlights the remaining area of friction. The 10 to 20% of uses not covered correspond to critical functionalities in many organizations: complex macros, business models, add-ins, specific integrations, and strong dependencies on formats. It is these uses that require long-term coexistence and explicit governance of user journeys.
In other words, sovereignty is not hindered by the volume of uses, but by their structuring nature, which is enough to make any fast and total substitution illusory.
Intentions vs. decisions: the wide gap
The study shows that sovereignty is clearly gaining ground in terms of intentions. It is cited as a strategic issue, a desirable goal, and sometimes a medium-term necessity, but when we look at the trade-offs, the report highlights a clear and recurring discrepancy.
This gap is very clear in the Lecko x Ipsos survey of 500 employees working in organizations with more than 250 employees. When asked about the possibility of replacing current suites with sovereign solutions, respondents expressed nuanced positions. Some saw a strategic or ethical benefit, but the majority expressed reservations based on very practical criteria: perceived efficiency, continuity of work, and quality of tools.
The result is clear: the number one priority remains having tools that meet needs, with sovereignty coming far behind in the actual hierarchy of trade-offs. The study therefore does not describe an ideological opposition but a pragmatic logic in which sovereignty is accepted as long as it does not disrupt execution.
Duality as a necessary step and an accepted cost
From an economic standpoint, the study is particularly clear. Any sovereign trajectory automatically creates a “double run” effect. Organizations continue to finance Microsoft bundles while investing in alternatives for migrated areas. This situation is a structural condition of the transition.
Lecko emphasizes three characteristics of this additional cost. It is inevitable, temporary but multi-year, and must be explicitly budgeted and defended as a control investment. The report goes so far as to issue a warning: underestimating duality weakens the program.
The problem is not that sovereignty comes at a cost, but that its cost is often treated as an anomaly to be quickly resolved, rather than as a structural phase to be managed.
What this duality actually does at work
While the study describes the coexistence of tools and contracts, I have deliberately chosen to focus on work. When alternatives cover 80 to 90% of uses, but the remaining 10 to 20% impose permanent exceptions, it is the teams that bear the complexity on a daily basis.
Lecko explicitly mentions the need for clear user journeys and governance of uses, but my opinion is that, without this design work, duality translates into an increased workload caused by constant trade-offs, hesitation, tinkering, and workarounds, not to mention the fact that when functional overlap occurs (and it is inevitable), two employees who need to collaborate may not use the same tool to do the same thing. Sovereignty then becomes an additional cognitive effort, supported by work rather than by the organization.
This cost is not quantified in the study, but it is described as a temporary overload experienced by teams during the migration, run, and support phases. In other words, sovereignty also comes at the price of complexity, not just budget lines, even if, in this case, the cost in terms of productivity should eventually become apparent, not to mention the impact on the employee experience and therefore on satisfaction and engagement (A complicated IT experience. Irritant #7 of the Employee Experience).
In other words, the absence of figures does not mean the absence of costs, but rather the shifting of costs away from the radar of governance.
The government: prescriber and actor
The study highlights a situation that is highly influential for the sovereign ecosystem, stemming from the fact that the State positions itself as both a promoter of a digital publisher ecosystem and a user of dominant solutions in its own working environments, as well as a producer of digital solutions designed to cover certain key uses.
By developing its own tools, the State is not content to simply define a framework or send political signals; it is de facto competing with the publishers it is supposed to support. It is simultaneously becoming a customer, prescriber, and market player.
By seeking to secure its uses through internal solutions, the government automatically reduces the size of the addressable market for sovereign vendors while calling on these same players to achieve sufficient critical mass to compete with dominant solutions.
This positioning creates a scissor effect. On the one hand, it legitimizes the discourse on sovereignty and stimulates supply, but on the other, it weakens publishers’ ability to reach critical mass by absorbing some of the customers who could serve as a basis for growth.
The elephant in the room
The study is crystal clear about Microsoft’s dominance, which, while primarily affecting office automation, messaging, and collaboration, precisely touches on an area that makes sovereignty so costly. We are talking about the core of daily work, where any friction is immediately felt and paid for in terms of experience and productivity.
In fact, the round tables that accompanied the presentation of the study delivered a fairly clear message: ultimately, there was less talk of sovereignty than of breaking out of the Microsoft ecosystem.
Breaking out of this ecosystem means rebuilding an entire foundation (identity, rights, formats, business integrations), and the report shows that this is not a problem of technical feasibility, but of organizational sustainability over time.
Bottom line
The figures from the Lecko study leave little room for doubt: while digital sovereignty is possible, it is neither fast nor painless, nor economically neutral. It requires accepting a multi-year duality and imperfect functional coverage.
The real risk is not in assuming the cost of this “double run” but in continuing to minimize it, allowing work to absorb what the organization refuses to manage (Work about work: when the reality of work consists of making things that don’t work work). Regaining control is a prerequisite, but the issue is more about creating the conditions for this recovery.
To answer your questions…
Digital sovereignty is widely accepted in principle, but faces challenges in practice. Work environments are heavily integrated around tools that have become standard in everyday use. Any change creates visible friction for teams, which complicates decision-making and slows down the process.
Bundles combine office automation, messaging, collaboration, and identity into a coherent offering. This integration limits choices on a tool-by-tool basis and reduces disruptions in usage. In comparison, sovereign alternatives require explicit decisions and a complete overhaul, which increases the perceived organizational cost of change.
No, they cover 80 to 90% of current needs. The difficulty lies in the remaining 10 to 20%, which are often critical: macros, business integrations, or format dependencies. These uses prevent quick total substitution and require long-term coexistence between solutions.
Any sovereign trajectory involves a “double run”: maintaining existing solutions and investing in alternatives. This additional cost is temporary but multi-year. The main risk is to underestimate it instead of accepting it as a structuring phase to be managed.
Complexity is often passed on to users. Constant trade-offs, multiple tools, and workarounds make daily work more difficult. Without clear governance, sovereignty results in temporary cognitive overload, which is not readily apparent in budgets but is clearly felt on the ground.
Image credit: Image generated by artificial intelligence via ChatGPT (OpenAI)
Related articles:
Arnaud Rayrole : Chief Digital Officers are the future CEOs
The Digital workplace : both fragmented and integrated
Why your Digital Workplace is hurting your organization’s performance
The end of enterprise social networks ?
Microsoft Viva: the revolution in employee experience platforms?
Digital workplace, AI, and interoperability: a problem that remains unresolved
